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I. INTRODUCTION
One night a mother and father are called and told that their son has been
involved in a serious car accident. When the concerned parents arrive at the
scene, they approach a police officer to inquire about the condition of their
son and his whereabouts. Instead of being responsive to the parents' request
and showing some degree of care, the officer refuses to give any information
concerning their son. After repeated attempts to get information from the
officer, he becomes increasingly belligerent and argumentative-making a
bad situation even worse for the anxiety-ridden parents. The mother
approaches the other driver involved in the accident to see if he has any
information about her son's condition. The agitated officer, however, quickly
intervenes and prevents the mother from speaking further to the other driver.
Finally, the officer tells the parents that their son was taken to a nearby
hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital, the parents fird out that the information
given by the officer was wrong, and that their son is at a different hospital.
When the parents finally arrive at the correct hospital, they learn that their
only son has died. Ultimately, the parents file a complaint against the officer
for hostile behavior and for acting in an unprofessional manner. I
Instead of initiating an Internal Affairs investigation, the Office of Police
Complaints contacts both parties to determine if they would be amenable to
resolving the complaint through mediation. After the parents and the officer
agree to mediate, they meet face-to-face with a trained mediator to discuss
their perspectives of the incident and express their feelings. The mediator
describes the session as extremely emotional for the parents and the officer.2
The officer expresses to the parents that his behavior that night was the result
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1 This is an example of an actual complaint filed against a Washington, D.C. police
officer in 2004. OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS (FORMERLY OCCR), WASHINGTON, D.C.,
ANNUAL REPORT 12, Mediation Example #1 (2004), available at
http://occr.dc.gov/occr/frames.asp?doc=/occr/ib/occr/info/docs/annual-report-fy04 cvr
chptl-3.pdf.
2 Id.
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of trying to handle the very bad car accident by himself in a tough
neighborhood.3 Nevertheless, the officer sincerely apologizes to the parents
for the loss of their son, and regrets that his behavior contributed to their
pain.4 As a result of the mediation session, the officer agrees to attend and
complete an appropriate stress management course through the Police
Department. 5
When one hears the term "police misconduct," often the most egregious
examples immediately spring to mind: the Rodney King beating in Los
Angeles, 6 the torture of Abner Louima in New York, 7 the shooting of
Timothy Thomas in Cincinnati,8 or the LAPD Rampart Scandal. 9 Many of
these incidents sparked widespread demonstrations and riots that captured
national headlines for several weeks. But for every Rodney King, Abner
Louima, or Timothy Thomas, there are hundreds of thousands of incidents
like the opening vignette-where police officers are alleged to behave in an
insensitive, hostile, or unprofessional manner. 10
Even though almost all alleged incidents of insensitivity, hostility, and
unprofessionalism fail to grab national headlines, it is equally important to
31d.
4 Id.
5Id.
6 See, e.g., Seth Mydans, The Police Verdict-Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in
Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at A1; Riot Statistics, THE ORANGE COUNTY
REG., May 29, 1992, at A4.
7 See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Protests May Disrupt Louima Trial, Lawyers Say, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 29, 1999, at B4.
8 See, e.g., Amy DePaul & Peter Slevin, Cincinnati Officials Impose Curfew: Mayor
Acknowledges Race Woes as City Acts to Quell Violence, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2001, at
Al.
9 See, e.g., Scott Glover & Matt Lait, 30 L.A. Officers Called to Testify Before
Grand Jury, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2000, at Al.
10 It is difficult to precisely quantify incidents of police insensitivity, hostility, or
unprofessionalism each year in the United States as a whole. However, between 1997
through 2000, 855 citizens filed complaints against Cincinnati police officers for "minor
issues," including rudeness, inappropriate remarks, discourtesy, and poor service. Robert
Anglen & Dan Horn, Police Review Themselves When Citizens Complain: Officers
Exonerated on 90% of Minor Issues, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 8, 2001, at Al & A 1l,
available at http:.//www.enquirer.com/editions/2001/07/08/loc_police review.htnil. In
New York City, the Civilian Review Complaint Board alone received 3,197 total
allegations of officer discourtesy in 2003. CIvILtAN REvIEw COMPLAINT BOARD, STATus
REPORT, JANuARY-JUNE 2004, at 9 tbl. lA (2004), available at
http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbsemi2004.pdf. During the same period there
were 474 allegations that police officers used offensive language. Id. In 2004, from
January to June, the Civilian Complaint Review Board received 1,606 total allegations of
officer discourtesy and 276 allegations of offensive language used by officers. Id.
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resolve these types of allegations to foster a better relationship between the
police and the communities they serve. A majority of Americans will interact
with a police officer at some point in their lives. 11 Most people expect that
during these interactions citizens would be treated with dignity, respect, and
professionalism. 12 As the Supreme Court warned, however, citizen
interactions with police have the potential to "inflict great indignity and
arouse strong resentment" in the community. 13
Much has already been written on the causes of police brutality and
corruption, 14  with various academics and professionals penning
recommendations to curb the more nefarious forms of police misconduct. 15
11 "An estimated 45 million United States residents-one in five-have some sort of
face-to-face contact with law enforcement officers annually[.] ... Among... such
contacts a third seek police help or offer assistance. Another third witness a crime or
report a crime to law enforcement officers. A little less than a third said the police
initiated the contact." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, One in Five U.S. Residents In
Contact With Police During Year (Nov. 22, 1997),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/puof.pr.
12 Surveys conducted by various organizations tend to reveal that minority groups
are perceived to be treated less favorably by the police and, more broadly, by the criminal
justice system, than whites. See, e.g., Dan Barry & Marjorie Connelly, Poll in New York
Finds Many Think Police are Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al. Just as troubling
is that these perceptions are very often correct. See generally David A. Harris, The
Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 265 (1999).
13 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (discussing how a police officer's "stop"
and "frisk" of an individual is more than a petty indignity, but "a serious intrusion upon
the sanctity of the person").
14 See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police
Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by
Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296 (2001); Susan Bandes, Tracing the Pattern of No Pattern: Stories
of Police Brutality, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 665 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, An
Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department's Board of Inquiry Report on
the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545 (2001); Robert W. Benson, Changing
Police Culture: The Sine Qua Non of Reform, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 681 (2001); Harold
Baer, Jr. & Joseph P. Armao, The Mollen Commission Report: An Overview, 40 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 73 (1995); POLICE BRUTALITY 60-105 (Louise I. Gerdes ed., 2004).
15 See generally Michael Rowan, Leaving No Stone Unturned: Using RICO as a
Remedy for Police Misconduct, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 231 (2003); Holly James
McMickle, Letting DOJ Lead the Way: Why DOJ's Pattern or Practice Authority is the
Most Effective Tool to Control Racial Profiling, 13 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 311
(2003); Asit S. Panwala, The Failure of Local and Federal Prosecutors to Curb Police
Brutality, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639 (2003); Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of
Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department "Pattern or Practice" Suits in
Context, 22 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 3 (2003); Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of
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The focus of this Note, however, is on the emergence of mediation 16 as a
promising means to resolve a specific subset of citizen complaints filed
against police officers. Mediation of citizen complaints is most appropriate
for cases involving allegations of officer discourtesy, insensitivity, hostility,
and other "minor" types of alleged officer misconduct. While mediation is
best suited to handle only relatively "minor" abuses of power, 17 police
departments must address these complaints to ensure and foster a sense of
trust, accountability, and justice in the communities they serve. 18 This is
especially true in police departments that embrace the "community policing"
model of law enforcement. 19
Law Enforcement Officers' Licenses and Federal Criminal Prosecution: An Opportunity
for Cooperative Federalism, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 121 (2003); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing With Police Abuse: The Lessons of Los
Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 305 (2001); Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial
Profiling, 33 COLuM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 41 (2001); Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of
Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA.
L. REV. 845 (2001); Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform,
35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (2001); JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE
LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE (1993); POLICE BRUTALITY 107-138
(Louise I. Gerdes ed., 2004).
16 Mediation is "an informal process in which a neutral third party with no power to
impose a resolution helps the disputing parties try to reach a mutually acceptable
settlement." ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 2
(1994).
17 One commentator explains that "people in the mediation field agree that no
complaint involving potential criminal charges against the officer should be eligible for
mediation" and that "[p]olice officials support this position." Samuel Walker, et. al, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Mediating Citizen Complaints Against Police Officers: A Guide for
Police and Community Leaders 18 (2002) [hereinafter Mediating Citizen Complaints].
See also infra Part IV.A, for a more detailed discussion.
18 The demonstrations and riots that followed the acquittal of the officers who beat
Rodney King and the shooting of Timothy Thomas arguably symbolized more than just
the beating and shooting of African-American men. The riots also reflected accumulated
feelings of injustice and distrust towards the police. See DePaul, supra note 8, at Al 1
("[T]he riots are not just a reaction to the killing of an African-American male, but to the
injustice to our people for so long."); see also BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16; at 47 (The
Rodney King beating "was the tip of the iceberg of police abuse that goes relatively
unchecked in cities across the country.... [T]he problem was not just police abuse but
unfair treatment of all kinds.").
19 The Department of Justice defines community policing as "collaboration between
police and citizens in a non-threatening and cooperative spirit. It requires that police
listen to citizens, take seriously how citizens perceive problems and issues, and seek to
solve problems which have been identified." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF GOOD
POLICING: AVOIDING VIOLENCE BETWEEN POLICE AND CITIZENS 29 (2003), available at
450
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Accordingly, Part II of this Note provides a general description of how
existing mediation programs in the United States operate. Part III focuses on
the benefits of using mediation to resolve allegations of police misconduct.
More specifically, it demonstrates why the use of mediation is often superior
to other methods of investigating or dealing with police misconduct. Part IV
examines the potential problems and shortcomings of mediation to resolve
allegations of police misconduct.
II. How THE AVERAGE MEDIATION PROGRAM OPERATES
As of 2002, approximately 16 citizen-police mediation programs were
operational in the United States.20 The first pilot program began in Portland,
Oregon in 1993.21 Most current mediation programs use a citizen oversight
body that screens citizen complaints to evaluate whether or not the complaint
is a good candidate for mediation. 22 While different criteria are used by
oversight bodies to select complaints for mediation,23 once a complaint is
selected for mediation, both parties are contacted to determine if they are
amenable to mediation.24
If the citizen complainant and the police officer voluntarily agree to
mediate,25 the complaint is referred to a professional mediation service, 26
http://www.usdoj.gov/crs/pubs/principlesofgoodpolicingfina1092003.pdf. The polar
opposite of community policing is the "proactive paramilitary style of policing," which
projects the appearance of "omnipresent intimidation and total command of the streets"
that is aggressive and confrontational. Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 568-570.
20 CITY OF PORTLAND, INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW (IPR) DIVISION, ANNUAL
REPORT 99 (2003), available at
http://www.portlandonline.com/shared/cfin/image.cfm?id=54001.
21 Id.
22 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 44. Walker notes that "four
mediation programs are operated by neighborhood community justice or dispute
resolution centers." Two of the mediation programs are operated by the police
department themselves. The remaining mediation programs are operated by citizen
oversight agencies. Id.
23 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
24 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 17.
25 During the mediation session the citizen is not entitled to legal representation. Id.
Likewise, the police officer is not entitled to legal or union representation. Id.
26 Id. at 29 ("Mediation programs should only use trained professional mediators.
Mediation is an important and complex undertaking, and it should not involve
amateurs."). "The Minneapolis Mediation Program requires that its mediators be
certified, and, in addition, attend a 40 hour course prior to mediating citizen complaints
against police officers." Peter Finn, Two Mediation Systems Help Manage Citizen
Complaints, THE POLICE CHIEF, Aug. 2000, at 67, 73. The Portland Mediation Program
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which typically has contracted with the city or oversight agency to provide
its services.27 Usually there is no cost to either party to participate in
mediation sessions.28 Prior to conducting the mediation session, the citizen
and police officer are required to sign a participation agreement and a
confidentiality agreement to encourage honesty and openness. 29 Once the
session begins, 30 the mediator facilitates the conversation and gives each
party an opportunity to describe its side of the incident.31 The session
continues until both parties come to a mutual resolution or until either party,
or the mediator, decides to terminate the session because a satisfactory
Guidelines state that "mediators are expected to adhere to standards of ethical practice
that are embodied in the Oregon Mediation Association's "[s]tandards of [m]ediation
[p]ractice." Independent Police Review Division, PSF-5. 10: Independent Police Review,
Mediation Program Guidelines (2002),
http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?&a=9041&c=27455.
27 For example, the Minneapolis Review Authority refers appropriate complaints to
the Minneapolis Mediation Program, which is a non-profit organization that has an
annual contract with the city of Minneapolis. Finn, supra note 26, at 71. Likewise, the
Washington D.C. mediation program has contracted with the Community Dispute
Resolution Center to provide "a pool of well trained, experienced, and diverse
mediators." OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS (FORMERLY OCCR), WASHINGTON D.C.,
ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2003), available at
http://occr.dc.gov/occr/frames.asp?doc=/occr/lib/occr/pdf/annual 
-report fy03fmanl.pdf.
Mediation programs that do not have a formal relationship with a mediation center often
draw from a list of certified mediators provided by the local bar association. Mediating
Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 45.
28 OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS, supra note 27, at 6.
29 For an example of the Agreement to Mediate required by the Minneapolis
Mediation Program, see PETER FINN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, CITIZEN REvIEw OF POLICE APPROACHES AND IMPLEMENTATION 75 (2001),
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesI/nij/184430.pdf.
30 The mediation process in this context is no different than other mediations.
Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 32. The session begins with an opening
statement or introduction by the mediator, which typically explains the process and
ground rules for the parties. Second, each party is given an opportunity to present his or
her side of the complaint. Third, the mediator summarizes the complaint in an impartial
manner, and helps the parties identify specific issues and set up a framework to discuss
the issues. Fourth, as the parties continue discussing the issues and possible solutions, the
mediator may help identify alternative solutions to the conflict, especially when the
parties may be unable to come up with their own solution. Fifth, the mediator may help
the parties choose the appropriate resolution and assist in the drafting of the agreement, if
the parties reach an agreement on the appropriate resolution. Id; see also NANCY ROGERS
& RICHARD SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW 20-39 (1987),
reprinted in STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 113 (2003).
31 CITY OF PORTLAND, supra note 20, at 102.
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agreement cannot be reached. 32 On average, most mediation programs allot
about an hour for each mediation session.33
If the parties come to a mutually agreeable resolution, or the complainant
expresses satisfaction with the process, the complaint is dismissed and no
further action against the police officer is taken by the police department. 34
Likewise, no record of the complaint is placed in the officer's personnel
file. 35 Most programs, however, have procedural safeguards in place so that
officers do not attempt to avoid departmental discipline by continually
agreeing to mediate complaints. Typically, an officer cannot mediate a
complaint if he or she has mediated a complaint involving similar conduct in
the past twelve months. 36
III. THE BENEFITS OF USING MEDIATION TO RESOLVE ALLEGATIONS OF
POLICE MISCONDUCT
A. The Shortcomings of Traditional Methods
A brief overview of the more traditional methods of resolving complaints
of alleged police misconduct helps illustrate the potential strengths of using
mediation to resolve conflicts between citizens and police officers. Typically,
citizens seeking to file a complaint about police misconduct have few
options; they can file a complaint with the department's division of Internal
Affairs,37 with a Citizen Review Board,38 or initiate a civil lawsuit for
deprivation of civil rights.39
32 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 34.
33 Id. at 33.
34 Id. at 34. If, however, the officer withdraws from the mediation session, he or she
runs the risk of having the complaint returned to Internal Affairs or the Citizen Review
Board for further investigation. Id. at 17. Accordingly, "mediation is more voluntary for
the citizen complainant than for the police officer." Id. at 34.
35 CITY OF PORTLAND, supra note 20, at 99-100.
36 OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS, supra note 27, at 6; see also Mediating Citizen
Complaints, supra note 17, at 19 (discussing New York's and Minneapolis' guidelines
for eligibility of officers to participate in mediation). In Portland, however, there is
recognition "[t]hat the number of complaints an officer may get is sometimes the result of
the nature of their assignment. In addition, we are not convinced that the disciplinary
system is in a better position to improve officer conduct than referrals to mediation."
CITY OF PORTLAND, supra note 20, at 101. Accordingly, Portland will review each
complaint on a case-by-case basis to determine eligibility for mediation. Id.
37 Internal Affairs is a division or office within a police department that is generally
comprised of police officers only, and has no civilian oversight. Barbara E. Armacost,
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 453, 536 (2004)
453
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Most citizens who file a complaint with Internal Affairs simply do not
believe any meaningful resolution will occur. This is due to the perception
that Internal Affairs is akin to "the fox guarding the hen house." 40 Internal
Affairs is perceived to protect police officers because a majority of
complaints are decided in favor of the police officers. 41 Likewise, Internal
Affairs Divisions operate with very little transparency during the
investigatory process and typically refuse to make public information
obtained in the course of their investigation.42 After a citizen files a
(citations omitted). The officers that comprise the Internal Affairs office "receive,
investigate, and adjudicate citizen complaints." Id. An internal affairs investigation
closely resembles a criminal investigation, whereby Internal Affairs will, inter alia,
"interview witnesses, prepare statements, collect physical evidence, and review arrest
reports." Id. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Internal Affairs office will submit
a written report stating its findings and recommended discipline, if any is warranted, to
the Chief of Police for final disposition and approval. Id.
38 Many communities have created Citizen Review Boards, which generally act as
external, independent oversight agencies that, depending on the community, have
differing responsibilities in the investigation and resolution of allegations of police
misconduct. For a more in depth discussion on Citizen Review Boards, see generally
Justina R. Cintr6n Perino, Developments in Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement, 36
URB. LAW. 387 (2004); Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United
States, 22 ST. LouIs U. PuB. L. REv. 151 (2003); Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled
Promise of Citizen Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 653 (2004).
39 For example, citizens may bring a federal action for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994), which states in pertinent part: "Every person who, under [color of
law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights... secured by the
Constitution... shall by liable to the party injured in an action of law."
40 Armacost, supra note 37, at 537 n.523 ("Perhaps the most significant limitation of
internal review is the potential for real or perceived conflicts of interest."); Chemerinsky,
supra note 14, at 604 ("Internal Affairs is run by officers steeped in the LAPD's code of
silence, loyalty, aggression, retaliation, and image protection."); Rob Yale, Note,
Searching for Consequences of Police Brutality, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1841, 1853 (1997)
(Internal Affairs is "the world's biggest washing machine. Everything that goes in dirty,
comes out clean.") (citations omitted).
41 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 15. Walker notes that about 90%
of all complaints are found in favor of police officers.
42 Armacost, supra note 37, at 537 ("The universal practice of police organizations
of limiting information regarding complaints filed and aspects of the
investigation.., creates an appearance of favoritism and undermines citizen perceptions
of legitimacy."); see also Steven D. Zansberg & Pamela Campos, Sunshine on the Thin
Blue Line: Public Access to Police Internal Affairs Files, 22 COMM. LAW. 34, 34 (2004).
The authors state that the mistrust of police officers, and the Internal Affairs process
itself, is fueled in part by police departments' refusal to allow public inspection of
completed Internal Affairs investigations. Denial of public access to these records is
454
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complaint or has his or her statement taken, the next contact is most likely a
terse letter from Internal Affairs notifying the citizen that the complaint has
been unsubstantiated or unfounded.43 In some cases, the citizen may never
learn about the disposition of his or her complaint against the officer.44
Accordingly, citizens are left unhappy and frustrated because they feel "their
issues were not adequately addressed. '45
Most Citizen Review Boards, while seeking to promote impartiality,
confidence, and thoroughness 46 in the investigation of police misconduct,
through the inclusion of civilians who are not sworn police officers,47 have
likewise failed to engender much confidence from the public.48 Many
complaints can take up to two years to be resolved.49 Of the 2,418
investigations conducted by the New York City Civilian Complaint Review
Board (CCRB) in 2000, only 8 percent "involved'at least one substantiated
allegation of police misconduct." 50 Even if a Citizen Review Board does
substantiate a misconduct complaint against an officer, the Board often has
little power to do anything but suggest an appropriate punishment to the
usually predicated on one of two grounds: "(1) the privacy rights of the officers involved,
and (2) the 'deliberative process privilege' attached to pre-decisional records
recommending a policy or course of action (i.e., what, if any, disciplinary sanction to
impose)." Id. Zansberg and Campos argue that greater public access to Internal Affairs
investigations under states' open record laws would help instill trust in the community
and accountability in the police. Id.
43 "At the close of the investigation, the complainant usually receives a 'close out'
letter stating the finding of the investigation. Often, this letter is the only information the
police department reveals to citizens." Armacost, supra note 37, at 536 (citations
omitted).
44 "Citizens who file minor complaints often are left in the dark about the outcome
of their cases[.]" Anglen & Horn, supra note 10. For example, a citizen filed a complaint
against an officer for making rude comments and generally unprofessional conduct in
1998. However, the citizen learned the officer had been exonerated only when contacted
by reporters in June of 2001. Id.
45 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 15.
46 Livingston, supra note 38, at 654.
47 Samuel Walker & Carol Archbold, Mediating Citizen Complaints Against the
Police: An Exploratory Study, 2000 J. DIsp. REsOL. 231, 232.
48 See Livingston, supra note 38, at 653. ("The New York Civil Liberties
Union... concluded that the [New York City Civilian Complaint Review] Board 'has
proved to be largely ineffective' .... At least from the perspective of public perception,
this is surely true in New York.") (citations omitted).
49 Jack Maple, Soapbox: Brutality Isn't Part of New Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
.1997, at Section 13 CY, Page 17.
. 50 Livingston, supra note 38, at 656.
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officer's superiors. 51 Another frequent criticism leveled against Civilian
Review Boards, mostly by the police themselves, is that "lay-persons lack a
sufficient understanding of police practices and operating conditions to
knowledgeably perform a meaningful evaluation" of police work.52 If the
Civilian Review Board cannot appreciate the risks involved in daily police
activity, then it cannot fairly assess the officer's actions in the underlying
incident contained in the complaint.53
However, it should be noted that the low substantiation rate of citizen
complaints is also a "function of the complaint procedure," as there is often
little independent evidence other than the complainant's word against the
officer's word.54 Without some independent evidence, it is "impossible to
determine the facts definitively." 55 This does not mean that one of the parties
is lying; it may simply be that there are differing perspectives on what
happened.
Internal Affairs Divisions and Citizen Review Boards are adversarial in
nature.56 Each is designed to find a "unitary or stable truth" about what
happened in order to determine liability and recommend the appropriate
punishment. 57 In many cases of minor police misconduct, however, it is
51 Bill Rhetts, Civilians Cannot Objectively Oversee Police Practices, in POLICE
BRUTALITY 161-164 (Louise I. Gerdes ed., 2004) (noting that Civilian Review Boards act
in a strictly advisory role, as they do not have the ability to terminate officers, prosecute
officers, or sanction officers).
52 Id. ("This would be similar to an automobile mechanic being chosen to evaluate
the work of a surgeon."); see also Armacost, supra note 37, at 535 ("One of the reasons
that members of all professions-from medicine to law to policing-resist outside review
of their conduct is that they view outsiders as having little insight into the practicalities of
their professional practice.") (citation omitted).
53 Sa'id Wekili & Hyacinth E. Leus, Police Brutality: Problems of Excessive Force
Litigation, 25 PAC. L.J. 171, 193 (1994).
54 Livingston, supra note 38, at 656.
55 Id.
56 The adversarial nature of citizen complaint procedures, both internal and
external, involves the following elements: [1] a citizen complaint is investigated
to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain it; [2] the accused
officer enjoys a presumption of innocence; [3] disposition of the complaint is
based on the strength of the evidence; [4] and, if the complaint is sustained, the
finding is referred to the police chief executive for disciplinary action.
Walker & Archbold, supra note 47, at 232.
57 Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives of
Dispute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REv. 833, 851 (2004) (discussing how "litigation is
consumed with determining 'what happened' in order to determine liability"); Armacost,
supra note 37, at 541 (noting that "these mechanisms have a 'fundamentally punitive
orientation"') (citation omitted).
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impossible to achieve a unitary truth about what happened because "most
police encounters occur under isolated conditions. '58 Moreover, "the
accounts of an incident proffered by the participants in such incidents are
often diametrically opposed: ... the citizen alleges that she was derided with
a sexist slur, an allegation vehemently denied by the police officer who cited
her for failing to pay the subway fare." 59
This does not suggest that investigating allegations of police misconduct
is always fruitless. Rather, in those cases where there is no independent
evidence or disinterested witnesses, it is unlikely that the complaint will be
resolved satisfactorily for the citizen.60 But, it is also unfair to punish a police
officer when there is no reasonable basis to believe misconduct has
occurred.61
Citizens, however, do not alone look skeptically upon the Internal Affairs
process. For example, it is not uncommon for officers in major police
departments to express their deeply held distrust for the disciplinary
system.62 The police officers who work in Internal Affairs are seen by their
peers as "headhunters" out to get fellow officers. 63 Likewise, rank-and-file
officers perceive the investigation process as unfair, alienating, and
protectionist of certain officers at the expense of others. 64 This perception of
the disciplinary system "undermines morale in the Department and reinforces
the code of silence, as officers are unwilling to use a disciplinary system they
regard as capricious and unfair. '65 Several officers interviewed by the Vera
Institute of Justice 66 expressed a desire to meet with citizens face-to-face. 67
The officers believe such an opportunity would provide them with the
occasion to explain their actions to citizens. 68
58 Livingston, supra note 38, at 656.
59 Id.
60 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 15. "Unsustained complaints
usually leave [complainants and police officers] unhappy: complainants feel their issues
were not adequately addressed and police officers feel they were falsely accused." Id.
61 Id.
62 Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 598.
63 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 7.
64 Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 598.
65 Id.
66 The Vera Institute of Justice was established more than 40 years ago to study and
implement reform in the justice system to ensure "faim[ness], human[ity], and
efficien[cy]." Vera Institute of Justice, Mission and Origins,
http://www.vera.org/about/about_2.asp (last visited Dec. 16, 2005).
67 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 7.
68 Id.
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Filing a civil lawsuit is no more attractive to citizens than filing a
complaint with Internal Affairs or a Citizen Review Board, and it is even
more onerous. Procedurally, civil lawsuits are costly, slow, and relatively
inefficient. 69 Moreover, many lawyers may be unwilling to take a
section 198370 case on a contingency basis because of the inherent financial
risk involved.71 Most complainants are also unlikely to have the financial
resources to engage in protracted litigation. 72 Even with counsel, and
assuming the alleged misconduct rises to a constitutional violation,
73
69 Based on the Federal Court Management Statistics for 2003, the median time
from filing a civil lawsuit to disposition was 9.3 months for all U.S. District Courts.
However, the median time from filing the suit to trial was 22.5 months. The percentage of
pending civil cases over three years old was 13%. U.S. Courts, Administrative Office,
Federal Court Management Statistics (2003), http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/cmsd2003.pl (select the "Generate" button for Caseload Profile). Arthur Miller writes
that "[t]he inability of the American judicial system to adjudicate civil disputes
economically and efficiently is one of the most pressing issues facing the court today."
Arthur Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 16 MINN. L. REv. 1, 1
(1984). He also analogizes federal civil litigation to the dance marathon contests of
yesteryear: "The object of the exercise is to select a partner from across the 'v,' get out on
the dance floor, hang on to one's client, and then drift aimlessly and endlessly to the
litigation music for as long as possible, hoping that everyone else will collapse from
exhaustion." Id at 9.
70 See supra note 39.
71 Tara L. Senkel, Note, Civilians Often Need Protection From the Police: Let's
Handcuff Police Brutality, 15 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 385, 413 (1999). In an attempt to
rectify this situation, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994), which allows a court,
in its discretion, to allow a prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees for certain
enumerated civil rights actions, including a § 1983 action. As described by the Supreme
Court:
Congress enacted §1988[b] specifically because it found that the private market for
legal services failed to provide many victims of civil rights violations with effective
access to the judicial process. These victims ordinarily cannot afford to purchase
legal services at the rates set by the private market. Moreover, the contingent fee
arrangements that make legal services available to many victims of personal injuries
would often not encourage lawyers to accept civil rights cases, which frequently
involve substantial expenditures of time and effort but produce only small monetary
recoveries.
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 576 (1986) (plurality opinion) (citations
omitted).
72 Id.
73 Arguably, most allegations of minor police misconduct-such as insensitivity,
hostility, and unprofessionalism-will not rise to a cognizable violation of the Fourth
Amendment. To illustrate, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), the
Supreme Court-reviewed a.§ 1983 suit filed against the City of Lago Vista, which alleged
that one of its officers violated Atwater's Fourth Amendment rights. Atwater was pulled
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prospective plaintiffs must clear several other hurdles. Police officers are
generally afforded qualified immunity while performing discretionary police
functions. 74 If the plaintiff is able to overcome a pre-trial motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted75 and claims of
qualified immunity, the plaintiff must still present sufficient evidence to
jurors. Several commentators suggest that juries may be sympathetic to
police officers who are defendants. 76 Juries are reluctant to sustain a criminal
or civil judgment against police officers because the jury "knows that cops
on the job are trying to protect not only themselves, but, more importantly,
US." 7 7
over after the officer observed that she and her two small children were not wearing
seatbelts as proscribed by Texas law. Id, at 323-24. After the officer approached the
vehicle, he began to verbally berate Atwater, placed her under arrest for the seatbelt
violation, put her in the back of his squad car, refused to allow Atwater to take her small
frightened children to a nearby friend's house, and then took her to the police station for
processing. Id. at 324. In a 5-4 opinion, the Court ruled that Atwater's custodial arrest for
the minor criminal offense of not wearing a seatbelt did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 354. Moreover, Atwater's arrest was not made "in an extraordinary
manner [that was] unusually harmful to [her] privacy or physical interests .... The arrest
and booking were inconvenient and embarrassing to Atwater, but not so extraordinary as
to violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 354-55 (citations omitted).
74 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) ("Despite their participation in this
constitutionally impermissible conduct, [government officials] may nevertheless be
shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did, not violate 'clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."') (citations omitted); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
("[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.").
75 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
76 See Wekili & Leus, supra note 53, at 189-91 (1994) (discussing how police
officers are trained to testify and how that impacts juror perception of them); Guido
Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 114-15 (2003) (in
the context of unlawful searches, jurors often fail to identify with plaintiffs who bring tort
actions against the police because the plaintiff is perceived to be a criminal, or the sort
likely to be a criminal); Armacost, supra note 37, at 468 ("Judges and juries (and most
ordinary citizens) view police officers as public servants who work under difficult,
dangerous, and uncertain conditions to maintain the 'thin blue line' between order and
chaos."). But see Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, The Price of Police Brutality: A Special
Report, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 17, 1997, at B5 ("New York juries, while more likely to
believe the officers 20 years ago, are now more likely to favor the victims[.]").
77 Scott Turow, Why the Diallo Verdict Isn't Surprising, WASH. POST, Mar. 13,
2000, reprinted in POLICE BRUTALITY 189, 191 (Louise I. Gerdes ed., 2004). From his
experience prosecuting police brutality cases, Turow states that "when a police officer is
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It is also clear that some citizens who complain about alleged officer
misconduct do not want the officer punished and do not seek monetary
compensation. 78 A Vera Institute study indicated that of all the complaints
against officers to the New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board,
only 20 percent of the complainants wanted the involved officer punished.79
Instead, 61 percent wanted to see the officer verbally reprimanded or
counseled. 80 Another study, which gave a hypothetical incident of police
misconduct to a focus group, indicated that participants would want an
apology or the "opportunity to express their views to the officer in person."81
As one commentator succinctly stated, "[f]or some complaints, it may simply
be more important that citizens have their perspectives acknowledged and
that police learn from the experience." 82
Thus, mediation can be an important tool for citizen complaints that
typically are not satisfactorily resolved by Internal Affairs Divisions, Citizen
Review Boards, or through civil lawsuits. Instead of dismissing an aggrieved
citizen's complaint outright, mediation seeks to provide a constructive
environment for citizens and the police to express their feelings, understand
and appreciate the other side's perspective,83 seek an explanation, or any
number of other possible solutions. 84 The potential benefits of mediating
minor allegations of police misconduct are best illustrated through the
transformative model of mediation, 85 the many ways in which mediation can
trying to do what he's been sworn to do, which is to corral bad guys, even if he has gone
about it overzealously or stupidly, juries often refuse to convict." Id. at 189.
78 CITY OF PORTLAND, supra note 20, at 97.
79 Livingston, supra note 38, at 664 n.51 (citing a 1989 Vera Institute of Justice
Survey).
80 Id.
81 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 9.
82 Livingston, supra note 38, at 664-65.
83 STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER PROCESSES 112 (2003).
84 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 9.
85 The transformative model of mediation will be more fully described infra in Part
III.B. For a more in depth analysis of the transformative model, see generally BUSH &
FOLGER, supra note 16. See also Dorothy J. Della Noce, From Practice to Theory to
Practice: A Brief Retrospective on the Transformative Mediation Model, 19 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. REsOL. 925 (2004) [hereinafter Della Noce, From Practice to Theory to
Practice]; Dorothy J. Della Noce et al., Clarifying the Theoretical Underpinnings of
Mediation: Implications for Practice and Policy, 3 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 39 (2002)
[hereinafter Della Noce, Clarifying]; Robert A. Baruch Bush & Sally Ganong Pope,
Changing the Quality of Conflict Interaction: The Principles and Practice of
Transformative. Mediation, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 67 (2002); Jeffrey R. Seul, How
Transformative is Transformative Mediation?: A Constructive Development Assessment,
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help find creative solutions to disputes, the reduced cost and greater
efficiency of mediation, and the greater citizen and officer satisfaction rates
with mediation.
B. The Transformative Model of Mediation: The Benefits of a
Meaningful Conversation
The transformative model of mediation is predicated on a "relational
ideology in which human beings are assumed to be fundamentally social-
formed in and through their relations with other human beings, essentially
connected to others, and motivated by a desire for both personal autonomy
and constructive social interaction. ' 86 A conflict within the transformative
model is a "crisis in some human interaction... [that] quickly degenerates
and assumes a mutually destructive, alienating, and dehumanizing
character." 87 More specifically, compared to an individual's pre-conflict
state, conflict may generate for the individual a sense of weakness, perceived
loss of control over the situation, doubt, and uncertainty.88 "This overall
sense of 'weakening' is something that occurs as a very natural human
response to conflict; almost no one is immune to it, regardless of their initial
'power position."' 8 9 In addition to personal weakness, the transformative
model presupposes that conflict will generate "self-absorption," whereby, as
compared to the pre-conflict state, "each party becomes more focused on
self-alone-more protective of self, and more suspicious, hostile, closed, and
impervious to the perspective of the other person."90 These notions of
weakness and self-absorption interact with and reinforce one another causing
a downward spiral in the two parties' interaction.91
The mediation process "contains within it a unique potential for
transforming people... by helping them wrestle with difficult circumstances
15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 135 (1999); Institute for the Study of Conflict
Transformation, http://www.transformativemediation.org (last visited Dec. 16, 2005).
86 Della Noce, Clarifying, supra note 85, at 51 (emphasis in original).
87 Id. at 50. "Conflict is ... most importantly about people's interaction with one
another as human beings. What affects and concerns people most about conflict is
precisely the crisis in human interaction that it engenders." Bush & Pope, supra note 85,
at 72-73.
88 Bush & Pope, supra note 85, at 73.
89 Id. (citations omitted).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 74. The interaction between weakness and self-absorption is described as a
"feedback loop." Id. "[T]he weaker I feel myself becoming, the more hostile and closed I
am toward you; and the more hostile I am toward you, the more you react to me in kind,
the weaker I feel, the more hostile and closed I become, and so on." Id.
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and bridge human differences[.]" 92 At the very core of the transformative
model is the belief that mediation has the potential to
generate two important effects, empowerment and recognition. In simplest
terms, empowerment means the restoration to individuals of a sense of their
own value and strength and their own capacity to handle life's problems.
Recognition means the evocation in individuals of acknowledgement and
empathy for the situation and problems of others. 93
Thus, mediation is more than simply helping conflicting parties reach a
resolution.94 At a deeper level, mediation can provide the parties with a sense
of empowerment and recognition, which will allow the respective parties to
better "understand themselves and relate to one another through and within
conflict."9 5
1. Empowerment
Mediation can achieve empowerment because the parties, in essence,
"own their own conflict. '96 More specifically, the parties themselves "control
the conflict resolution process, and craft resolutions that are mutually
agreeable. '97 The feelings of weakness and incapacity engendered by the
conflict are transformed during the mediation into "self-worth, security, self-
92 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 2.
93 Id. (emphasis in original).
94 To achieve empowerment and recognition, the mediator's responsibility is
(1). to foster empowerment shifts, by supporting-but never supplanting-each
party's deliberation and decision-making, at every point in the session where choices
arise (regarding either process or outcome) and (2) to foster recognition shifts, by
encouraging and supporting-but never forcing--each party's freely chosen efforts
to achieve new understandings of the other's perspective.
Bush & Pope, supra note 85, at 84. While the specific means by which mediators
accomplish these goals are beyond the scope of this Note, see generally BUSH & FOLGER,
supra note 16, at 113-226; Bush & Pope, supra note 85, at 85-95.
95 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 4. Moreover, Professors Bush and Folger argue
that "empowerment is an objective that can be achieved in all cases; recognition, on the
other hand, can only be attained when parties willingly give it-either in response to a
mediator's efforts or spontaneously." Id. at 94. However, "[recognition] is achievable
much more often than normally assumed." Id.
9 6 EDWARD W. SCHWERIN, MEDIATION, CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT, AND
TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS 7 (1995).
97Id.
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determination, and autonomy" because the party has regained a sense of
strength to take "greater control over [his or] her own situation. ''98
When a complaint is resolved through Internal Affairs or a Civilian
Review Board, there is no opportunity to achieve empowerment-for either
the officer or citizen-because those processes are controlled by third parties
responsible for resolving the conflict and crafting the appropriate resolution,
to the exclusion of the parties in conflict.99 If the citizen and the officer are
unable to "regenerate some sense of their own strength... it is unlikely they
can move on and be at peace with themselves... [and] [t]he parties'
confidence in their own competence to handle life's challenges remains
weakened[.]"' 00
Through mediation, however, the police officer and the citizen are active
participants and take actual control of the process to reach a mutually
agreeable resolution. As each party participates in the mediation, the officer
and citizen may individually become empowered in several different ways.
First, "she reaches a clearer realization.., of what matters to her and why,
together with a realization that what matters to her is indeed important."10'
Second, "she becomes aware of the range of options available to secure her
goals in whole or part, and of her control over those options... [including]
whether or not to stay in or leave the mediation... [and] accept or reject a
possible solution."' 0 2 Third, "she increases or adds to her own skills in
conflict resolution. She learns how to better listen, communicate, organize,
and analyze issues, present arguments, brainstorm and evaluate alternative
solutions ... and then strengthens those skills by using them practically in
the mediation."' 0 3 Fourth, "she gains new awareness of resources already in
her possession (or readily available to her) to achieve her goals and
objectives." I 4 Finally, empowerment is achieved when "she reflects,
deliberates, and makes conscious decisions for herself about what she wants
to do-including decisions about what to do in the mediation discussions
98 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 85-87.
99 "According to advocates of mediation, some forms of conflict management such
as the formal court system are disempowering for the disputing parties because of the
domination and control of judges and lawyers that is inherent in the court system."
SCHWERIN, supra note 96, at 7 (emphasis added).
100 Bush & Pope, supra note 85, at 75-76.
101 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 85. Bush and Folger label this as
"empowerment as to goals."
102 Id. at 86. Bush and Folger label this as "empowerment as to options."
103 Id. Bush and Folger label this as "empowerment as to skills."
104 Id. at 86-87. Bush and Folger label this as "empowerment as to resources."
463
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
themselves, and decisions about whether and how to settle the matter or what
other steps to take." 10 5
2. Recognition
Recognition in mediation is achieved when a party "voluntarily
choose[s] to become more open, attentive, sympathetic, and responsive
to ... the other party, thereby expanding their perspective to include an
appreciation for another's situation." 10 6 Within the traditional framework of
resolving police misconduct, there is no opportunity for either the police
officer or the complainant to achieve recognition. 10 7 Accordingly, mediation
sessions provide a unique opportunity for the parties to have a face-to-face
conversation, thereby allowing for the recognition and appreciation of the
other party's perspective. The following hypothetical helps demonstrate the
achievement of recognition in the context of police misconduct.
Early on a weekday morning, a detective and several officers forcefully
pound on an apartment door, yelling for the occupants to open the door. 108
Still groggy and dressed only in t-shirts, a mother and her teenage daughter
go to the door to see what the officers want. The mother partially opens the
door and the detective informs her that they have an arrest warrant for "John
Smith." The mother truthfully informs the detective that "John Smith" is her
daughter's ex-boyfriend, but that he is not in the apartment, nor has he been
to the apartment for several weeks. Nevertheless, the detective insists that he
and the other officers come into the apartment to ensure that "John Smith" is
not there. Although the mother consents, she innocently begins to close the
door so that she and her daughter can put on more appropriate clothing. The
detective immediately places his foot in the door so that it cannot be closed.
Enraged, the mother begins to scream at the detective and other officers for
infringing upon their privacy. In return, the detective, losing his temper,
threatens her with arrest for obstruction if she fails to calm down. After the
incident, the mother files a complaint against the detective for hostility and
unprofessionalism.
105 Id. at 87. Bush and Folger label this as "empowerment as to decision making."
106 Id. at 89.
107 See Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 6. ("In traditional citizen
complaint review procedures the complainant and the officer never meet face-to-face, and
as a consequence there is no opportunity for dialog and understanding.") (citations
omitted).
108 The hypothetical is loosely based on an actual case referred to mediation by the
New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board. Livingston, supra note 38, at 663.
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At the mediation session, the mother and the detective each discuss their
individual perspectives of the underlying incident, and listen to the other
party's perspective. For her part, the mother begins to appreciate and
understand the detective's point of view: the detective was concerned about
officer safety because he did not know if there were weapons in the
apartment or who else may have been in the apartment; people often lie in an
attempt to buy extra time for the person of interest to escape, hide, or obtain a
weapon; the intent of the detective was not to humiliate either woman; and,
more generally, effecting an arrest warrant is a highly stressful endeavor
requiring officers to maintain control over the situation. 10 9 For his part, the
detective begins to appreciate and understand the mother's point of view: she
had just been roused out of her sleep by loud banging on the door; the mother
was confused as to why the police would be at her door looking for someone
who did not live there; the mother was not attempting to be obstructive, but
simply protecting her daughter's modesty. 110
Thus, the detective and the mother achieve recognition by moving away
from their individualized perspectives of the incident in order to
"acknowledge, consider, and be concerned about the
other['s perspective]."''I I When parties achieve recognition through the
mediation process, they begin to see the other party in a more favorable
light."12
A corollary to the transformative model's recognition of the other party's
perspective is the notion that the mediation process promotes greater
understanding in other areas. For example, citizens have the opportunity to
become more familiar with policing and the stress associated with an
officer's job." l3 During mediation the police officer can explain the
information he had at the time of the incident, which formed the basis of his
actions. 114 Through mediation, citizens can also come to an understanding
that police officers are just like everyone else: officers have bad days and can
109 Id.
l10 Id.
11 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 91.
112 Id. at 90.
113 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 10. In one case
a sergeant who, returning from an extremely stressful call... and feeling very
upset, tailgated a car, ticketed the driver, and used inappropriate language during the
interaction. The mediation session, however, provided an opportunity for the officer
to explain the circumstances of the incident and for the citizen to understand the
effect ofjob stress on the officer's behavior.
Id.
114 FINN, supra note 29, at 77.
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often lose their tempers when confronted with rudeness and hostility."l 5
While "[o]fficers are not justified in losing their temper[s] and berating a
citizen... mediation can help citizens understand why officers did so.- 116
Police officers, for their part, also realize how their behavior or actions
affect citizens.1 17 An officer's tone or mannerisms with a citizen may
escalate tensions during an encounter. 118 Accordingly, "what [the officer]
did on the job is proper, [but] how they did it may offend people." 1 9 Police
officers who take the mediation session seriously can learn how to handle
themselves in a more professional manner and reduce friction with citizens in
the future. 120
C. Mediation as a Way to Find Creative Solutions to Problems
One of the strengths of using mediation to resolve minor allegations of
police misconduct is that there is no predetermined outcome to the dispute. In
contrast to Internal Affairs, Civilian Review Boards, or a judge, a
"mediator... has no power to impose an outcome on disputing parties.' 121
Rather, it is up to the parties themselves to determine the appropriate
resolution to the complaint. Mediation can be an important tool in resolving
citizen complaints because the range of possible solutions to any given
problem is virtually limitless. Mediation, therefore, allows for a resolution
tailored to the needs of each situation.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 6.
118 In an exit survey, one officer reported: "The citizen and I got to explain our
actions in a friendly manner. I was able to see both sides of the situation and see how it
escalated." CITY OF PORTLAND, supra note 20, at 107.
119 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 7 (emphasis in original).
120 FINN, supra note 29, at 79. For example, a Portland police officer was the subject
of complaints from citizens on a fairly regular basis. Even after several "conversations"
with his superior officers, this particular officer failed to clean up his act. After receiving
another citizen complaint, the officer was referred to mediation. In an exit interview the
officer stated that prior to mediation he was often frustrated because he genuinely tried to
conform his behavior, but did not understand what he was doing wrong. The mediation
session with the citizen, however, helped him understand how citizens perceived his
actions and that helped him realize what he had been doing wrong. After the mediation
session, he was no longer a "problem officer." Telephone Interview with Laurie Stewart,
Program Director for the Portland Mediation Program (Mar. 7, 2005) (notes on file with
author).
121 GOLDBERG, supra note 83, at I11.
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When a complaint is successfully mediated, the prototypical outcome is
simply that the complaint was resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.
122
Or, the terms of the agreement may simply read, "[b]oth parties agreed that
the dialogue was helpful in allowing them to understand each other's
experiences and viewpoints.' 123 In other cases, the police officer, the citizen,
or both may apologize to each other for the misunderstanding. 124
The more creative solutions that have been used to resolve complaints
demonstrate how mediation can build greater amounts of trust,
understanding, and accountability between the police and citizens. 125 For
example:
* In Washington D.C., several high school students filed complaints
against a group of police officers alleging that they were harassed
after leaving a convenience store near the school. The officers told
the students that they matched the description of people selling
drugs. The complaint was referred to the mediation program, which
then set up a plan for the students, school officials, and over 15
officers to engage in a mediation program. As a result of mediation,
the parties set up a working group comprised of students and police
officers in an effort to develop a better relationship. 126
* Also in Washington D.C., a complainant alleged that an officer was
unprofessional after the complainant reported a possibly stolen
vehicle in front of his house. The complainant explained that the
officer was extremely rude and responded to him in an accusatory
manner. As a result of the mediation the officer agreed to take a
sensitivity course which included stress management, negotiation,
and respectful communication. 127
122 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 34.
123 FINN, supra note 29, at 74.
124 Office of Police Complaints, Washington D.C., FAQs About the Mediation
Program, http://www.occr.dc.gov/occr/cwp/view,a,3,q,495519.asp#1 (last visited Dec.
16,2005).
125 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 35.
126 OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS, supra note 27, at 12-13.
127 OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS, WASHINGTON D.C., ANNUAL REPORT, Example
#2, (2002), available at
http://www.occr.dc.gov/occr/frames.asp?doc=/occr/ib/ccr/pdf/annualreport-fy02-final
.pdf.
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* In Minneapolis, one officer agreed to attend a cultural diversity
course after a successful mediation session based on an undisclosed
complaint. At the conclusion of another mediation session, a
different complainant provided resource materials to the Minneapolis
Police Training Unit on hypoglycemic diabetes for use in officer
training. Yet another complainant agreed to go on a ride-along with
an officer. 128
* In an unnamed city, an African-American citizen alleged that an
officer used an offensive racial epithet while speaking to him. The
complainant reportedly told the mediator that "I just wish [the
officer] could see me in church on Sunday to see what kind of person
I really am." At the suggestion of the mediator, the citizen and the
officer agreed to have coffee together after church. 129
These examples are important because they not only demonstrate how
mediation can foster trust, understanding, and accountability, but also how
mediation can allow parties to craft mutually agreeable solutions unique to
their complaint. 130 Many resolutions may be fairly simplistic, like being able
to explain to the other party why he or she acted in a particular manner. Yet
other resolutions, such as ride-alongs,13 1 may promote an even greater
understanding and appreciation for the policies, procedures, and precautions
that officers follow.
D. Economic Cost and Efficiency of Providing a Mediation Program
The most practical concern about providing mediation programs to
resolve minor allegations of police misconduct is the financial cost to run
such a program, especially where police oversight agencies already complain
about the lack of adequate resources.1 32 There is also likely to be trepidation
128 FINN, supra note 29, at 74.
129 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 35
130 Id. ("When such creative outcomes are agreed to, however, it is important to
document an understanding of what activity will occur and that it was satisfactory.
Failure of one side or the other to fulfill the terms of the agreement would be considered
[an] unsuccessful mediation.").
131 Ride-along programs allow citizens to accompany police officers in police
vehicles during a portion the officer's tour of duty. See Metropolitan Police Department,
Police Ride Along Program, http://mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/cwp/view,a,1242,q,547130.asp
(last visited Dec. 16, 2005).
132 Vivian Berger, Mediation Helps Build Understanding Between Cops and
Citizens, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2000, at 18, 18.
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in creating a program that requires well-trained and experienced
mediators, 133 but will only mediate a small subset of complaints against the
police. However, the average cost to mediate an allegation of police
misconduct is significantly lower than an investigation by either Internal
Affairs or a Civilian Review Board.
Based on available information, the average cost for each successful
mediation session ranged from $133 to $150.134 In comparison to the
relatively inexpensive cost of mediating citizen complaints, the average cost
of an investigation by either Internal Affairs or Civilian Review Board is
significantly higher. A review of nine different Citizen Review Boards found
that the "Mean Cost per Complaint Filed or Reviewed" ranged from $361 to
$4,864 in 1997.135 Likewise, an evaluation of the Minneapolis Police
Department's Internal Affairs Division found that the average cost per
complaint was approximately $6,278 in 1996.136 The Portland Mediation
Program estimates that the average cost to investigate a complaint by Internal
Affairs is roughly $1,000.137
133 To ensure that mediation is conducted by well-trained and experienced
mediators, many current programs contract with local mediation agencies or keep a roster
of qualified mediators in the area. See supra note 26. In Minneapolis, for example, the
Civilian Review Authority pays $2,000 a year to the Minneapolis Mediation Center to
mediate. Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 13. The $2,000 is used only to
cover administrative costs, as the individual mediators work on a pro bono basis. Id. at
44. On the other hand, the Portland Mediation Program pays mediators $50 per hour for
their services. Telephone Interview with Laurie Stewart, supra note 120.
134 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 13 ("In Minneapolis each
successful mediation case cost $153 in 1998 and $133 in 1999."). The average cost per
mediation for the Portland Mediation Program was around $150 in 2004, including the
officer's paid attendance. Telephone Interview with Laurie Stewart, supra note 120.
135 FINN, supra note 29, at 131-32. However, both Finn and Professor Walker note
the considerable difficulty in obtaining reliable data on the average per-case cost of
conducting either an Internal Affairs or Citizen Review Board investigation. Mediating
Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 14. "[C]onsequently, putting mediation in a
meaningful cost context is difficult." Id. For example, one study found that the average
cost per complaint in Berkeley, California was approximately $8,571. Id. Yet a different
study found the average cost to be only $4,864. ld. "[T]he discrepancy highlights the
difficulty in obtaining reliable data regarding the cost of complaint investigation." Id.
136 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 14. It is also important to
recognize that the average amount of money spent on an Internal Affairs investigation
includes not only minor allegations of police misconduct, but also the more egregious
complaints of misconduct like the use of excessive force and corruption. The total cost to
investigate one allegation of officer discourtesy may pale in comparison to an undercover
sting operation to catch a police officer selling previously seized narcotics.
137 Telephone Interview with Laurie Stewart, supra note 120. The figure of $1,000
was calculated by estimating the average time it took to complete the investigation of the
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Even though it may be difficult to precisely quantify the average costs to
either mediate or investigate a complaint, mediation is nevertheless a more
efficient and cost-effective solution for minor allegations of police
misconduct. Aside from the administrative time it takes to screen the
appropriate cases for mediation and setting up the mediation itself, the
amount of time spent actually resolving the complaint is on average 2.5 hours
for mediation. 138 In comparison to mediation, traditional complaint processes
are far more labor-intensive and require more time to investigate. 139
Similarly, the average time it takes to process a complaint, from the
intake of the complaint to final resolution, is typically much shorter for
mediation than the traditional complaint process. Of the successfully
completed mediations in Portland, Oregon during 2003, 90 percent were
resolved within four months after intake of the complaint.' 40 Compared to
mediation's short turn-around time, the now defunct Washington, D.C.
Citizen Complaint Review Board141 averaged eight months between the date
a complaint was filed to the date a recommendation was handed down.142 In
the following years, that average time frame for the Review Board steadily
complaint by a Sergeant in Internal Affairs (about 15 hours at $35/hr), added to the time
necessary to prepare the written report (about four hours at $35/hr), added to the cost of
bringing the subject officer (about 1.5 hours at $25/hr), and his union representative (1.5
hours at $30/hr), into Internal Affairs for a statement, plus miscellaneous other costs and
overhead ($252). Id.
138 Id. The average mediation session lasts for approximately 1.25 hours. The other
1.25 hours is used prior to the mediation session by the mediator for "case development,"
where the mediator reviews the complaint and prepares for the session. Id. In
Washington, D.C., however, the average mediation session lasts for a "couple hours" and,
depending on what the parties and mediator agree is appropriate, can extend into multiple
mediation sessions. Office of Police Complaints, supra note 124.
139 A traditional complaint investigation can take on average 15 hours to complete.
Telephone Interview with Laurie Stewart, supra note 120.
140 CITY OF PORTLAND, supra note 20, at 109. In 2003, the Portland Mediation
Program reported that one of their main goals was to improve on timeliness. For the 20
successfully mediated complaints in 2003, 5 complaints completed mediation within 60
days of intake; 8 complaints completed mediation within 60-90 days; 5 complaints
completed mediation within 90-120 days; and the remaining 2 completed mediation
more than 120 days after intake. Id. The typical delays included working around the
personal and business schedules of the mediator, officer, and complainant. Id.
141 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 13.
142 Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (D. D.C. 1993) (holding that
consistent and chronic delays endemic to the civilian review complaint process can
constitute a policy or custom that may amount to deliberate indifference to the rights of
citizens who come into contact with police officers) See also Mediating Citizen
Complaints, supra note 17, at 13.
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increased, until 1990 when the average time was a staggering 33 months
between receipt and resolution. 143
Accordingly, mediating minor complaints of police misconduct can be a
useful resource to help ease the financial burden of labor-intensive
investigations conducted by Internal Affairs or Civilian Review Boards.
Without mediation, these types of complaints are otherwise relegated to the
traditional complaint processes at a greater economic cost and investigated in
a less efficient manner.144 Mediation can help "enable[] oversight and
internal affairs staff to devote more time to more serious cases or reduce their
backlog of cases. '145
E. Greater Satisfaction Rates With Mediation
Citizens and police officers that have participated in mediation report a
significantly higher satisfaction rate with the process. Exit surveys from the
Portland Mediation Program show about 52 percent of the complainants
believed that the dispute was completely resolved to their satisfaction, 32
percent believed the dispute was partially resolved to their satisfaction, and
only 16 percent indicated that the dispute was not at all resolved to their
satisfaction. 146 Surveys completed by the officers after mediation showed
about the same satisfaction rate: 70 percent believed the dispute was
completely resolved to their satisfaction, 15 percent believed the dispute was
partially resolved to their satisfaction, and the remaining 15 percent believe
that the dispute was not at all resolved to their satisfaction. 147 Perhaps more
indicative of the satisfaction rate of the parties participating in mediation was
their response to the question, "[w]ould you recommend the mediation
process to others?" Almost 97 percent of the citizens said yes, while the other
3 percent said they were unsure. 148 Close to 86 percent of the officers said
143 Cox, 821 F. Supp at 6; see also Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of
Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective In Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 753, 783 (1993) (explaining that the average Internal Affairs Investigation can take
anywhere from 60 days to one year).
144 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 14.
145 FINN, supra note 29, at 79.
146 CITY OF PORTLAND, supra note 20, at 105. The Annual Report also states that the
sample size was too small to effectively compare the satisfaction rates of mediation
against the satisfaction rates of the traditional complaint process. Id. at 104.
14 7 Id. at 105.
148 Id.
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they would recommend mediation, about 5 percent said they would not
recommend it, and the remaining 9 percent said they were unsure. 149
While other programs have not published detailed statistical data on
satisfaction rates like the Portland Mediation Program, many report that their
mediation programs are also well-received by the parties. The 2004 Annual
Report for the Washington, D.C. program states "the overwhelming majority
of complainants and subject officers who responded to the survey found the
mediator to be helpful or very helpful, the mediation session to be
satisfactory or very satisfactory, and the resulting agreement to be fair or
very fair."'150
IV. POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS AND PROBLEMS OF USING MEDIATION
TO RESOLVE CITIZEN COMPLAINTS
Even though mediation has promising benefits to offer, there are some
concerns about the use of mediation for resolving complaints against police
officers. The general concerns that typically arise with the use of mediation
in this context include the types of complaints that are appropriate for
mediation, and whether mediation will produce any lasting results or solve
larger systemic problems in police departments.
A. Concerns About the Types of Cases that are Appropriate for
Mediation
As noted earlier in Part II, the various mediation programs across the
United States use different criteria to select cases they believe to be
appropriate for mediation. While most programs will categorically deny any
complaint that involves excessive use of force resulting in an injury, police
corruption, or those allegations that may subject a police officer to criminal
liability, there has been some general debate about the appropriateness of
mediating cases that involve complaints with racial or ethnic overtones, 151 or
cases involving the use of force that do not result in an injury to the
complainant.
149 Id. In addition to the figures already cited, 100% of the citizens and officers
believed that the mediators were fair to both sides. Likewise, 93.3% of the citizens
believed they had an opportunity to explain themselves during the process, and 96% of
the officers felt the same way. Id.
150 OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS, supra note 1, at 12.
151 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 21.
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1. Racial and Ethnic Related Complaints
There are several different arguments for and against mediating
complaints that have a racial or ethnic component. While a few complaints
involve the use of a racial slur,152 the most common complaints involving
race or ethnicity implicate disparate treatment. 153 The argument against
mediating racial or ethnic-related complaints typically centers around the
notion that the mediation will not be conducted on a level playing field.154
An oft-voiced concern about mediation, generally, is that it "may be an
instrument of oppression where there is a gross imbalance in bargaining
power between the parties." 155 Since police officers occupy a unique role in
society that comes with an inherent amount of power, 156 some commentators
are wary that such power will put citizens, especially minorities, at a
disadvantage during mediation sessions. 157 Disadvantaged citizens will not
be able to "engage as equals in the deliberation and decisionmaking that
occur within [the mediation] process."'158
152 d at 19 (noting that as a matter of policy the San Francisco Mediation Program
does not mediate complaints that allege that an officer used a racial, ethnic, or gender-
related slur).
153 Telephone interview with Laurie Stewart, supra note 120; see also Mediating
Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 19.
154 National Black Police Association, NBPA Statement Regarding Mediation
(2000) (on file with the author).
155 Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Quiet Revolution Comes to Kentucky: A Case Study
in Community Mediation, 81 KY. L.J. 855, 873 (1993).
156 Mediating Citizens Complaints, supra note 17, at 27. The inherent power that
police officers bring to the mediation session is best symbolized by their uniform.
Professor Walker notes that there has been some concern about police officers wearing
their uniforms to mediation sessions because
[t]he uniform symbolizes the unique power of the police officer, which tends to
create a power imbalance in mediation... On the other hand, a few people
interviewed feel that the uniform may actually increase the significance of a
satisfactory outcome in that the complainant and the officer first made contact in
these status positions, so the outcome may give the complainant a sense of power
and control.
Id. at 28.
157 See id. "The community... enters into a... relationship with the police, ceding
to them the power to deprive persons of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."'
Kenneth Adams, What We Know About Police Use of Force, in USE OF FORCE BY
POLICE: OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA 1 (1999), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/176330-1.pdf.
158 Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights From
Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 57 (2004).
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Another commentator, and former police officer, believes that mediation
perpetuates the problem of racial discrimination in policing. 159 If officers are
allowed to subvert the traditional disciplinary system by voluntarily agreeing
to participate in mediation, they avoid departmental punishment for practices
of racial discrimination.1 60 Likewise, even though litigation is often more
costly and less efficient than mediation, "[it] has been a powerful instrument
of social change that has provided an avenue by which the powerless level
the playing field with powerful groups or institutions."' 161
On the other side of the argument, that mediation is an appropriate
mechanism to resolve complaints involving race and ethnicity, proponents
argue that the mediation process in this context is completely voluntary.162
The complainant is free to have his or her complaint resolved through the
traditional complaint process or terminate the mediation session at any time
"if he or she feels victimized by a power imbalance[.] ' 163 The right to
terminate the mediation session is an important safety valve for the
complainant if he or she begins to feel uncomfortable in the situation.
Proponents also argue that mediation can have a "special role" in helping
to "bridge the racial and ethnic divide because it is the only procedure for
investigating complaints that brings the disputing parties together in a face-
to-face meeting."' 164 In many instances, the mediation session will allow each
party to explain and clarify their actions or perspectives so that "[e]ach party
can see where the other is coming from."'1 65 In the same vein, mediation can
also help abolish stereotypes that some police officers believe about
minorities and those stereotypes that minorities have about police officers. 166
Another argument in favor of using mediation to resolve complaints
involving race and ethnicity stems from the notion of empowerment from the
159 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 20.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 21. In other situations-such as divorce, child custody, and probate-a
court may order both parties to attend mediation to resolve their conflict. Id. at 17.
163 Id. at 21.
164 Id. at 22 ("In contrast, the lack of direct contact perpetuated by traditional
complaint investigation procedures may aggravate racial and ethnic divisions, leaving
both sides angry and suspicious of the other.").
165 Berger, supra note 132, at 18 (citation omitted). From her experience as a
mediator in New York, Professor Vivian Berger believes "that these complaints lend
themselves extremely well to non-evaluative, purely facilitative mediation." Id.
166 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 21 ("[Pjolice officers are often
perceived as symbols of an oppressive society. For their part, some officers react to
young men of color in a symbolic or stereotypical manner.").
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transformative model of mediation. 167 Because minorities may feel
powerless as a result of conflict with the police, 168 mediation is an important
opportunity to transform the feelings of weakness and incapacity into "self-
worth, security, self-determination, and autonomy."' 169
With specific safeguards in place, many of the legitimate concerns about
mediating racial and ethnic complaints can be obviated. First, the use of
trained and experienced mediators ensures that complainants are not
victimized by a power imbalance. Qualified mediators are better able to
create a "level playing field" and likely to be more "cognizant of both
manifest and latent racial dynamics" occurring between the parties. 170 If the
mediator is unable to adequately level the playing field, the mediator may
also simply terminate the mediation session.
Second, programs that choose to mediate these complaints can
implement a two person "team" of mediators to facilitate the sessions.171 For
example, the team could be comprised of one Caucasian mediator and one
African-American mediator. The potential benefits of such an approach
include: the ability of mediators to "share perceptions about what is taking
place and how to proceed, [o]ne mediator can pick up on verbal and
behavioral cues the other may have missed, [and both] mediators can
brainstorm [together on] possible solutions when mediation reaches an
impasse." 172
Third, a rigorous complaint screening process can ensure that "the parties
[are] capable of dealing fairly with each other." 173 The staff responsible for
selecting the cases eligible for mediation needs to be conscientious of the
officer's specific complaint history, mediation history, and general patterns
of conduct that may suggest a more systemic problem. If the staff believes
that a particular officer will not be amenable to mediation, or has previously
167 See supra Part III.B. 1.
168 See Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 22 ("Empowerment is
especially important in regard to race and ethnicity-related complaints, because the core
issue in police-community relations for nearly 50 years has been the powerlessness many
racial and ethnic minorities fell with respect to local police.").
169 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 87. See also supra note 159 (discussing how
successful mediations with a uniformed officer may give complainants a sense of power
and control).
170 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 27.
171 FINN, supra note 29, at 74. For example, the Minneapolis Mediation program
always uses two mediators, one man and one woman, for all sessions, regardless of the
nature of the complaint. Id.
172 Id.
173 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 23.
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demonstrated a lack of good faith in the process, then the traditional
complaint investigation process is more appropriate.
Apart from the dynamic between the parties, another concern with
mediating allegations involving racial or ethnic related claims of misconduct
is that "cultural and [ethnic] based stereotypes may block a disputing party's
trust of the mediator." 174 A mediator's ability to help the parties come to a
successful resolution of the complaint depends in large part "upon the
willingness of the parties to accept the mediator. ' 175 Without trust, parties
may become more defensive, less candid, and unwilling to value the
mediator's help or advice. 176 In order to gain trust, the complainant and the
police officer must perceive that the mediator is someone who cares about
both parties, treats them impartially, is honest, and will protect each party
during the mediation session. 177 However, a citizen who files a complaint
involving an issue of race or ethnicity may initially believe that the mediator,
who shares the same race or ethnicity of the officer, may not be objective
during the mediation session. The officer may likewise question a mediator's
neutrality if the mediator is the same race as the citizen.
For example, a Caucasian motorist files a complaint against an African-
American officer for racial discrimination stemming from an incident during
a public event. 178 The motorist alleges that he observed the officer allow
several African-American drivers pass onto the blocked street that had been
closed for the public event, but turn away several Caucasian drivers. The
complaining motorist attempted to gain access to the blocked street, where
his office was located, but the officer would not let him pass and a heated
exchange ensued. After the complainant and the officer agree to mediation,
the Caucasian motorist arrives at mediation to find that the mediator is an
African-American woman. Prior to the start of the mediation session, the
motorist may question whether the mediator will have the ability to be
impartial. Likewise, as the mediation session progresses, the motorist may
continue to doubt the mediator's impartiality if he perceives that he is not
being treated equally or fairly in relation to the officer.
174 GOLDBERG, supra note 83, at 149.
175 ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 30, at 113.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 The underlying facts are from an actual complaint mediated by the Washington
D.C. mediation program. OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS, supra note 1, at 13-14.
However, in the course of the mediation neither the complainant nor the officer
questioned the mediator's neutrality. I use the underlying facts only to set up the
example.
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There are several possible solutions to the problem when one of the
parties may question the objectivity of the mediator because of his or her
racial identity. In many cases, it may be important for the mediator to
caucus 179 with each party to establish trust, allow the party to privately
express any concerns they may have about the mediator's neutrality, and
clarify any issues prior to the start of the mediation session.180 Another
solution is to again use the two-person mediation team to facilitate the
session.1 81 Finally, if one party is unlikely to trust the mediator's neutrality
the mediation session should be terminated.
2. Use of Force Complaints
There has also been disagreement on whether allegations involving the
use of force is appropriate for mediation. Commentators generally agree that
any allegation which, if sustained, exposes an officer to criminal liability
should not be mediated.' 8 2 The underlying reason is that an allegation
involving a potentially criminal use of force "is too serious of an issue for
mediation," 183 and Internal Affairs or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or
both, should investigate such allegations. 184 However, the policy that all use
of force complaints should not be mediated has not been universally
accepted.
For example, the New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board will
allow complaints of excessive force to be mediated so long as there is no
injury to the complainant and both parties agree to mediate. 185 Minneapolis'
Civilian Review Authority will likewise allow use of force complaints to be
179 A caucus is:
a private meeting the mediator conducts with each party during the course of
mediation. They are used to: provide an opportunity for a party to vent and cool
down when emotions flare; encourage candor and get to the root of the dispute;
clarify an issue; spend time alone with a party to build trust; provide time to review
the issues and alternatives[.]
ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 30, at 117.
180 Id.
181 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
182 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 18. For example, an officer who
maliciously strikes an individual who is handcuffed and fully compliant may be subject
to criminal liability. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
183 CITY OF PORTLAND, supra note 20, at 100.
184 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has the authority to investigate allegations
of use of excessive force in possible violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
185 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 18.
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mediated if there is not injury to the citizen. 186 Portland's Mediation Program
has refused to categorically exclude use of force cases because "[it] means
losing valuable opportunities for citizens and police to better understand each
other's perspective, explore how they might prevent similar problems in the
future, and for citizens to come to a satisfying resolution of their
complaint."'187 The Portland Mediation Program also takes the position that
in most circumstances the use of force by its officers is determined to be
appropriate under the circumstances. 188
One particular problem with the debate on the appropriateness of use of
force complaints for mediation is that there is not a single, universally
accepted definition of what constitutes "force."'1 89 Moreover, the term force
connotes a wide spectrum of tactics that police use in different
circumstances. 190
In training police officers, most police departments employ some type of
"use of force continuum," 191 which often takes the form of a pyramid or
ladder, 192 that represents a "fluid and flexible policy guide"' 93 for officers to
186 Id.
187 CITY OF PORTLAND, supra note 20, at 100.
188 Id.
189 "Police administrators and social scientists... undoubtedly differ on exactly
what constitutes force." TOM MCEWEN, NATIONAL DATA COLLECTION ON POLICE USE OF
FORCE 43 (1996), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ndcopuof.pdf. As a
practical example of the problem, in several pieces of literature Professor Walker notes
that "use of force complaints should be ineligible for mediation." Mediating Citizen
Complaints, supra note 17, at 18; SAMUEL WALKER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT MEDIATING CITIZEN COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS 7,
http://www.policylab.org/downloads/CDAP%20mediation.pdf (last visited Dec. 16,
2005). However, Professor Walker provides no general description of what he means
when using the term "use of force" or the term's contours.
190 Adams, supra note 157, at 3 (discussing how different definitions of force will
yield different statistics in evaluating use of force data from various police departments;
for example, "broad definitions of use of force, such as those including grabbing or
handcuffing a suspect, will produce higher rates than more conservative definitions").
191 See Appendix A for a representative example of the use of force continuum. The
use of force continuum-along with additional information on the use of force-is also
available at http://www.cpso.pdx.eduhtml/forcepolicy.htm.
192 Paul W. Brown, The Continuum of Force in Community Supervision, FED.
PROBATION, Dec. 1994, at 31, 31.
193 Letter from Steven H. Rosenbaum, Chief of the U.S. Dep't of Justice Special
Litigation Sec., to Alejandro Vilarello, Miami City Attorney 3 (Mar. 13, 2003), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/miamipd techletter.pdf.
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use in the field when confronted with a situation requiring force. 194. At the
first, or lowest level of the typical' 95 use of force continuum is the mere
presence of an officer, which includes body language, demeanor, and
identification of authority.196 The second level of force involves verbal
communication-giving a direct order, questioning, or persuasion-when the
individual is argumentative or verbally resistant.197 The third level of force
involves an officer using physical contact, or "soft-hands techniques," 198
which includes directional contact or escorting an individual. 199 In the fourth
level of force, the police officer uses physical control by means of takedown
maneuvers, use of pressure points, or other physical defensive tactics to gain
compliance of a physically resistive individual.200 The fifth level of force is
classified as serious physical control, whereby the use of impact or
intermediate weapons, or both, focused blows or kicks, or chemical irritants
are authorized. 201 The sixth, and final, level of force on the use of force
continuum is the use of deadly force which encompasses "any force that is
readily capable of causing death or serious bodily injury."20 2
The use of force continuum, which virtually encapsulates every type of
contact that a citizen may have with a police officer, demonstrates the
difficulty of using the bright-line rule that "use of force complaints should be
ineligible for mediation," 20 3 without then providing a working definition of
what constitutes use of force. The concern with the suggested bright-line rule
194 See generally Adams, supra note 157, at viii (noting that "officers are trained to
use force progressively along a continuum, and policy requires that officers use the least
amount of force necessary to accomplish their goals").
195 1 use the term "typical" in the sense that all police departments who use the use
of force continuum are free to modify the continuum to reflect the specific types of force
its officers are trained to use. For example, many police departments place the use of
physical defensive tactics on a lower level of the continuum than the use of mace, pepper
spray, or other chemical irritants. The Federal Probation and Pretrial Services System,
however, has placed the use of chemical irritants before the use of physical control in its
use of force continuum because its officers do not receive defensive tactics training.
Brown, supra note 192, at 35.
196 Use of Force Continuum, Appendix A. "Although commonly not thought to
constitute force, the mere presence of the officer represents authority and control.
Presence is the proper level of force when the offender is basically compliant without
additional direction from the officer." Brown, supra note 192, at 33.
197 Use of Force Continuum, Appendix A.
198 Letter from Steven H. Rosenbaum, supra note 193, at 4.
199 Use of Force Continuum, Appendix A.
200 Id.201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See supra note 189.
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is that it is under-inclusive, thereby excluding complaints that may be
particularly good candidates for mediation.
For example, a college student alleges that one night after leaving a bar a
police officer approached him, escorted him to the hood of the police cruiser,
and forced him to lay spread eagle on the cruiser while "frisking" him.
Although he was not physically injured, the student nonetheless believed that
he had done nothing wrong, and that the officer was without just cause.
Accordingly, the student files a complaint against the officer alleging the use
of excessive force.20 4 In this scenario, it is clear that the officer used some
level of force against the student: the student was escorted to the police
cruiser, forced to lay spread eagle on the hood, and then frisked. Under the
bright-line rule, this complaint would be ineligible for mediation. If this case
was allowed to proceed to mediation, however, the officer would have
explained that he was called to a disturbance at the bar and a third-party
pointed to the student as the offender.205 This would explain why, the officer
approached the student and "took precautions to ensure the student was not
armed and under the officer's control. ' 20 6 The officer would have explained
that it was a case of mistaken identity,20 7 and possibly apologized to the
student for the inconvenience. The student would have understood why the
officer acted in that manner.20 8
Ultimately, the better method to determine which use of force complaints
to mediate is through a case-by-case analysis, looking at several different
factors. Using the Portland Mediation Program209 as a model, complaints
204 The underlying facts are from an actual complaint mediated by the Minneapolis
Mediation Program. Finn, supra note 26, at 74.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. It is also important to note that had the college student filed a complaint with
Internal Affairs, the officer's conduct would likely be found to be an-appropriate use of
force under the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)
(The Fourth Amendment "permit[s] a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of
the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual
for a crime.").
209 Portland uses "more inclusive case selection criteria" in determining which
complaints to mediate. CITY OF PORTLAND, supra note 20, at 100. The only cases that are
not mediated involve corruption, criminal misconduct by the officer, or cases where an
officer is a potential witness against a complainant in a pending criminal action. Id. In
addition, if a particular officer has demonstrated that he or she "is not amenable to
mediation.., that officer will not be invited to participate in future mediations." Id. at
101. Mediation is approved for those complaints "where IPR and LAD believe
[mediation] is likely to (1) result in greater complainant satisfaction, (2) improve citizen
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should be reviewed by Internal Affairs and the appropriate citizen oversight
agency for mediation eligibility. In determining which complaints to mediate,
several factors should be evaluated: the type of force employed, the amount
of force employed, injuries to the complainant (if any), injuries to the officer
(if any), the outcome of the contact (was the complainant arrested, cited, or
warned), and if the complaint was sustained by Internal Affairs against the
officer, would it lead to the imposition of serious discipline (termination,
demotion, or lengthy suspension).210
B. Mediation as a Means to Change Organizational Culture or Solve
Systemic Problems
One of the growing areas of research and debate over police misconduct
is the role of police departments' organizational culture and its
"underappreciated" link to police misbehavior.211 Recent scholarship
suggests that police officers on the streets are not "independent agents," but
instead "act within the constraints of a very powerful organizational culture
that significantly influences and constrains their judgment and conduct. 212
When police officers interact with citizens, they behave in the manner in
which they have been trained, whether "explicitly or implicitly." 213
Accordingly, "interventions seeking to change cop behavior must include the
organization or they will ultimately fail."214
understanding of police procedures and actions, (3) result in improved officer conduct,
and (4) contribute to community policing goals of improved citizen-police relations." Id.
at 100.
2 10 Id.
211 Armacost, supra note 37, at 456.
212 Id. at 476. In the context of police brutality, Professor Armacost argues that
incidents of police misconduct are often not aberrations by "rogue cops" acting outside
the accepted behavior of an otherwise professional police force. Id. at 455. Politicians and
police leadership who attempt to distance the department from incidents of misconduct or
brutality fail to understand, or worse ignore, the power of the police organization as a
cause of police misconduct. Id. at 458. Thus, "viewing police brutality as a string of
unrelated incidents belies reality." Id. at 476.
213 Id
214M. at 521. Professor Armacost identifies three primary traits of police
departments that "predispose officers to abuse their power." Id. at 516. First, "officers
consider themselves to be the thin blue line between social order and disorder." Id.
Charged with the maintenance of law and order in society, and empowered by the state to
defend against chaos, police can overreact in situations. Id. at 517. Second, "police
officers regard disrespect and resistance by citizens as a threat, not only to them
individually, but to the very social order." Id. Police may treat these individuals more
aggressively because they "need to be taught a lesson." Id. Third, "police officers believe
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.To date, there have been no empirical studies or scholarly research
investigating the impact of mediation on police departments' organizational
culture. However, the leading commentator and proponent of using
mediation to resolve allegations of police misconduct, believes that
mediation can "eventually" have an impact on the organizational culture of
police departments. 215 While the current organizational culture of many
police departments "works against building or maintaining a respectful,
trusting relationship with citizens,"216 mediation is uniquely situated to help
foster trust and accountability between officers and citizens.217
Even though mediation does not confront the problem of organizational
culture on a broad scale, it can slowly have an impact as individual officers
participate in the mediation process with citizens. When an officer achieves
recognition 218 and understands the citizen's point of view, it may be harder
to be insensitive, hostile, and unprofessional. 219 When a significant number
of police officers begin to lose the "us versus them" mentality, the possibility
of creating healthier organizational norms increases.220 Likewise, more
police officers may be willing to change the organizational culture if they are
"active participants in the process of self-reform. '221
that they have been given the impossible task of keeping society safe while, at the same
time,.. [being] constrained by unrealistic legal and constitutional demands." Id.
Inherent in these three traits is also what some commentators refer to as the "us versus
them" mentality. Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 11; Armacost, supra
note 37, at 517.
215 Mediating Citizen Complaints, supra note 17, at 11.
216 Id.
217 WALKER, supra note 189, at 5.
218 See supra Part III.B.2.
219 See Berger, supra note 132, at 18.
220 Armacost, supra note 37, at 541.
221 Id.
[B]oth internal (police) review and external (citizen) review have inherent
limitations in their ability to effect change in the organizational culture of policing.
One of the primary impediments to their effectiveness is that these mechanisms have
a "fundamentally punitive orientation" rather than a reformative one: Police officers
operating within an adversarial system [like internal and external review], pushed to
prove their "innocence" and to defend themselves at all costs, will rarely see a
citizen's complaint and its investigation as grounds for changing their behavior.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
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V. CONCLUSION
The emergence of mediation as a means to resolve minor complaints of
alleged police misconduct has been an important development in helping to
strengthen the relationship between citizens and police officers. Mediation is
a non-confrontational forum for the parties to come together and put their
issues on the table and cooperatively strive for a mutually agreeable solution
to the conflict. Out of the conflict is an opportunity for both parties to regain
a greater sense of self-worth and control, as well as a better appreciation for
the other party's perspective.
Mediation for citizen complaints against police officers is still in its
relative infancy. Yet, the existing programs have demonstrated a great deal of
success in terms of satisfaction rates, efficiency, cost savings, and problem
solving. As more mediation programs are developed across the country, and
more complaints are resolved through existing programs, the empirical data
is likely to show mediation's effectiveness in rebuilding trust, accountability,
and justice in communities.
While no one is quite ready to label mediation the panacea for police
misconduct,222 in comparison to the traditional complaint procedures, it is
not that far off.
222 Berger, supra note 132, at 18.
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APPENDIX A
FORCE CONTINUUM
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Also available at http://www.cpso.pdx.edu/html/forcepolicy.htm.
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